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Background
On 7 January 2011, Brig Gen Eugene Haase, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM) J-8, traveled to the Pentagon to brief the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). The purpose of his brief, SOF to Service Transition Brief to JCB, was to highlight the fact that SOCOM is meeting SOF (Special Operations Forces) requirements with a host of capabilities which could be, should be, or are already Service-common. 2 If true, this fact prompts several implications. First, SOCOM may be paying for items or capabilities that rightly should be paid by one of the three Service departments. Two, there are items or capabilities developed and fielded by SOCOM that can satisfy current Service requirements, but for various reasons have not been directed to do so. Or, three, there are items or capabilities developed and fielded by SOCOM which could be used to satisfy a Service need or requirement, but have not been highlighted or considered as an alternative. The first two implications seem to suggest a lack of higher-level authority above SOCOM and the Services in directing transitions from Special Operations-peculiar (SO-peculiar or SOF-peculiar) to Service-common, while the third implication suggests a lack of "advertising", i.e. the need for a clearing house of ideas. General
Haase's brief suggested the DoD did not have a defined process for the Services to adopt SOF capabilities. In effect, there is no push-pull system(s) for which, and from which, SOF-peculiar items, services, and capabilities can transition to Service-common. He further suggested the JCB, and its subsidiary Functional Capabilities Boards, are the ideal forums to discuss joint SOF to Service transition candidates and requirements. In open discussion, the general's assertions and recommendations met great resistance i from statutory members of the JCB, as well as non-statutory advisors in the audience. The body recommended non-concurrence with the brief.
Introduction
To be sure, SOCOM leadership believes this is a problem. As with most disagreements in government, where you stand depends on where you sit. Certainly, there are other organizations, or vested parties, who can or could counter these assertions. Yet, as this paper will later show, with the exception of SOCOM's insistence, no other interested parties have resoundingly stepped forward to either confirm or refute SOCOM's claims, at least publicly.
However, SOCOM found through an internal audit there are items for which they are paying, but
should not. Therefore, conventional wisdom would seem to support SOCOM, especially as there is evidentiary proof that items or services have fallen through the gap. Based on that, this paper asserts that the DoD lacks a single process/adjudicating authority to decide when, or if, an item or service should transition (from SOF-peculiar to Service-common), or who should own the fiscal responsibility. Furthermore, in this era of fiscal conservatism and shrinking budgets, the lack of process is proving detrimental to USSOCOM, and paradoxically, an opportunity lost for the Services. In order to support this assertion, this paper will take an investigative look at the issue by first taking an historical look at the foundation for SOF-peculiar items as intended and established in law. Next, with this foundation, the paper will provide insight for SOCOM's possible motives for following this path, including the results of an internal audit. The paper will then shift to chronicle actions SOCOM has taken to highlight the issue. Afterward, in an effort to provide an objective look at the issue, this paper will endeavor to provide the other side of the argument. This monograph will then turn to an analysis of the various forums which could offer a solution. Finally, it will offer possible solutions as to a way ahead. 4 Along with this provision, it provided for a four-star general or admiral to command all active-duty and reserve SOF. 5 Second, it formalized the elements or missions of special operations. 6 Finally, the amendment created a "checkbook" for SOCOM within a new DoD funding category, Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11). 7 Central to MFP-11 is the SOCOM commander's authority to develop and acquire Special Operations-peculiar equipment, material, supplies, and services. 8 By definition, SOF-peculiar "is equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement." 9 This begs the question of what is a Service-common requirement or item. Joint Publication 1-02 describes it as equipment, material, supplies, and services adopted by a Service for use by its own forces and activities. 10 The definition goes on to say these things may even be provided to support and sustain its own forces assigned to the combatant commands. 11 The definition finishes by saying that items and services defined as Service-common by one Service are not necessarily Service-common for all Services. 12 In practice, labeling items as SOF-peculiar or Service-common is not as easy as it seems. In fact, more often than not, SOCOM will take a Service-common item and then modify it with SOFpeculiar equipment. Take for instance the AC-130U Spooky Gunship. The basic C-130 platform is Service-common, i.e. it was bought and paid for by the Air Force. The "mission equipment", sensors, guns, and defensive gear are specific to the SOF mission and therefore have popularly become the "pinch hitters" of national security. 13 In fact, even with projected conventional drawdown in Afghanistan through 2014, there will be an increasing dependence on SOF.
Foundations of SOF-peculiar
14 That is, "conventional force reductions will not equate to comparable reductions in SOF." 15 In addition to being a functional combatant command that traditionally organized, trained, and equipped SOF, SOCOM is now also charged with synchronizing DoD's planning against terrorists and their networks. 16 Of course, with the rise in SOF demand and new missions has come concomitant growth, the bulk of which is a result of budget actions derived from Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) 2006 and 2010. The command today contains approximately 54,000 active duty, Reserve, and National Guard Soldiers, Sailors, Airman, Marines, and DoD civilians. 17 That is double the manpower since 9/11. 18 And, the budget has nearly tripled to $10.5 billion i . 19 While that might sound like a substantial budget, consider that it is just 1.4% of the DoD budget. 20 By comparison, the Air Force's FY12 budget request is $119 billion. Nevertheless, while SOCOM has grown in size, scope, and funding, demand for SOF and fiscal pressures have outstripped its resources. To compound the problem, the DoD writ large is anticipating cutting approximately $450 billion over the next decade. 21 Additionally, DoD has begun to move OCO funding into the baseline budget, which has in effect created additional bills. What does this mean for SOCOM? To put it succinctly, in a growing fiscally austere environment, SOCOM seeks to manage its resources closely. Hence, SOCOM is looking for more efficient expenditure of its resources. Accordingly, SOCOM looked for, and continues to look for, ways it can cut away from unnecessary and duplicative expenses. In an internal SOCOM review ii of 77 programs, 9 different programs were found to already be in use by one or more Service. 22 These items spanned a wide spectrum of capabilities, from weapons and ammunition to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets to maritime craft. 23 In five i of these programs, SOCOM currently has $68 million in their FY13-17 budget request. 24 The same review went on to note six other programs SOCOM researched, developed, and fielded that met current Service requirements. 25 Once again, it totaled a small amount. While seemingly insignificant, given the relative size of the SOCOM budget it adds up. However, SOCOM's motives may also be about principle. Olson sought, and is seeking a better investment of MFP-11 in SOF-peculiar modifications or capabilities, which could in turn meet common solutions for Service requirements. 31 Consider a few examples. The first is the Stand-off Precision Guided Munition (SOPGM), named "Best in Defense Acquisition". It was fielded in under 11 months at a system cost of less than $10 million. 32 Since fielding, the SOPGM has been used in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM with devastating results. 33 A second example is the Mobile Multi-Band Jammer used to counter radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IED). A SOCOM acquisition team was able to develop, test, and deliver 1200 kits in just nine months. 34 As a testament to the team's success, the system is now used by the Navy, FBI, DIA, and other government agencies. 35 So, while it may be true SOCOM is trying to make available resources for its own reasons, it also believes it can help all of DoD with some of its unique and quicklyfielded SOF-peculiar capabilities. This is why during its internal audit, SOCOM not only found Service-common items it was funding through MFP-11, but also items currently funded by SOCOM MFP-11 that can or should meet Service requirements, as well as items that could meet Service-common requirements. 36 Therefore, one may conclude the motive of SOCOM, as articulated by General Haase at the JCB, is to not only look for a process to free up SOF funding by transitioning SOF-peculiar items to Service-common, but also offer the Services an opportunity to take advantage of some of the capabilities SOF has developed. Now, with an understanding of SOCOM's motives, it is important to understand the steps SOCOM has taken to try to highlight the issue.
SOCOM Makes Its Case
In Executives, to regularly review and solve a wide range of acquisition challenges. 43 These forums were also intended to minimize programmatic disconnects, to better align requirements, and co-sponsor development opportunities. 44 The first session occurred on 29 September 2010.
Of importance, one of the due outs from this session decried that DoD did not have a defined occasions where an impasse is reached…consequently, the need for a process that provides mediation and adjudications at a higher level is necessary." 45 He went on to say the DoD lacked a process to ensure "MFP-11 resources are expended on valid Special Operations (SOF) requirements". 46 Clearly, Admiral Olson did not think SOCOM was getting the support it needed through the JROC process, and despite the AT&L summits and new MOA with the USAF. With an understanding of SOCOM's motives, and the campaign it undertook to highlight the problem, this paper will now offer the other side of the story, or at least the perceived other side.
The Other Side of the Story
Objections to SOCOM's desire to have a process to transition SOF-peculiar to Servicecommon is largely muted. The Services themselves certainly have not complained, but then one would not expect them to, as any highlight of a deficiency or mislabeling would likely cause funding obligations (bills) for that Service. And, in these fiscally constrained times, no Service is going to voluntary burden itself in order to fund something currently funded by SOCOM.
Simply put, the Services do not have extra money. When one looks outside of the Service departments in the larger DoD enterprise there are no complaints either. In fact, there are no DoD IG reports on the subject, and no complaints by the Combatant Commands. As for organizations outside the DoD that routinely scrutinize the military, namely the Congress and its independent watchdog, the Government Accountability Office, there has been zero investigations into the misapplication of SOF-peculiar or Service-common monikers, or any process thereof.
The latter organization did look at SOCOM's management of weapon systems programs in 2007
at the request of Congress. 47 In their report they noted that while most of the command's programs are small, and properly managed, the overall program performance of acquisition programs is mixed. 48 This was due to the fact about 50% of SOCOM's funded programs tended to be larger and more costly, platform-based programs that rely heavily of Service-common programs and program management support. 49 With that said, there has been little complaint outside of SOCOM about the characterization of SOF-peculiar and Service-common, or any process which determines such. Undoubtedly equipment, material, supplies, and services have and do transition from SOF-peculiar to Service common. So, in the absence of a process, the question is how do things transition now, or how have they transitioned in the past?
Analysis
The fact of the matter is more often than not, transition ordinarily occurs out of mutual agreement, and usually at the acquisition level. That is, as a capability germinates there are quite often procedural acquisition documents that specify responsibilities, to include funding arrangements. Of course, real agreement is realized when the funds are actually budgeted and subsequently obligated. In other instances, OSD will direct or mandate who pays for capability via some sort of budget document, such as Resource Management Decisions (RMDs), or through a key strategy document with budget implications, such as the QDR. For example, in the 2010 QDR, the Army and SOCOM were directed to add a company of upgraded MH-47G helicopters to the Army's 160 th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. 50 This arrangement inherently implies the Army will supply basic CH-47 helicopters, along with the manpower to outfit a helicopter company, while SOCOM will fund the modifications to make the helicopters MH47Gs, as well as provide for the operations and maintenance funding of the added company.
Outside of these two nominal means, mutual agreement and budget documents, there are other venues or places where decisions can be made on case-by-case basis. One such venue is the Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG) i . Chaired by the DepSecDef, the DAWG consist of a diverse, high-level membership from across the DoD, to include the Services and SOCOM. 51 Normal agenda items include topics of strategic importance or issues with programmatic implications. 52 Additionally, DAWG members can recommend agenda items at any time. 53 The DAWG would appear to provide SOCOM a venue to raise transition items of concern, principally because it does and can make adjudication decisions between the Services and between DoD agencies. However, the dilemma for SOCOM is most of its issues are tied to ACAT III ii programs, and therefore do not generally rise to the discussion level of the DAWG.
Recently the DepSecDef renamed the DAWG the DMAG [Deputy's Management Action
Group], with a new focus on efficiency to ensure "management actions are synchronized and fully coordinated across the defense enterprise." 54 In this new forum, the DepSecDef will decide which topics will be chosen. 55 For SOCOM this basically means it will be even less likely routine transitions of SOF-peculiar to Service-common will be discussed. Alternatively, the body that serves just below the DAWG or DMAG, the 3-Star Programmers Group iii , is a venue where such items could be vetted, and mutually agreed upon. However, it cannot compel, but rather pass recommendations on to the DMAG. Once again, given the size of the transitions (ACAT III) such items are unlikely to elevate.
Another venue SOCOM could seek out is the AT&L summits it jointly holds with USD AT&L and the Service Acquisition Executives. These meetings could bear considerable fruit, Its membership reflects that of the DAWG, but at the program/budgeting level.
given the level of participation by those in the acquisition community. In fact, in the words of Admiral Olson, these forums are meant to "minimize programmatic disconnects, and to better align requirements, co-sponsorship opportunities, funding efficiencies and contracting actions among MFP-11 programs and Service related/dependent programs." 56 Of course, this adjunct body may not necessarily have the authority to compel a funding obligation, or even a solution.
It instead acts as a clearing house of acquisition information from which mutual agreements could be made. As it has already done, SOCOM could also engage the Services individually and directly in joint warfighter talks on items of particular interest. Once again, this is not a forum which compels, but may allow for mutual agreement.
Still another forum, or series of forums, SOCOM could utilize is the FCBs and the JCB.
Paradoxically, and perhaps unwittingly, with SOCOM seeking out authorities to designate the SOCREB a FCB and JCB-like entity in order to "speed up" the approval process, much of its programs and requirements documents have now been removed from the mainstream FCBs and JCB, and therefore do not necessarily receive the visibility they might previously have had under the prior FCB and JCB arrangement. Likewise, the Services, or OSD for that matter, do not participate in the SOCREB, and therefore, there is no visibility into SOF-peculiar programs that may be of benefit to the Services. Yet, regardless of arrangement, the FCBs and JCB do not necessarily have the authority to compel. That would nominally come from the JROC, which based on the outcome of the January 2011 SOCOM brief, is unlikely to decide such matters.
However, it would certainly seem the JROC, despite its reluctance as voiced by the JCB during 59 Though CPMs are charged to identify issues, priorities, and capability and resources mismatches, they have no independent decision making authority. 60 As it can be seen, none of these forums or bodies is a panacea for the 
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can safely be said the DoD lacks a single process/adjudicating authority to decide when or if an item or service should transition from SOF-peculiar to Service-common, or who should own the fiscal responsibility. SOCOM certainly believes this to be the case and prodded by increasing demand on SOF, embarked on a campaign to highlight the problem to OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. For their part, these organizations and entities, as well as other entities in and outside the DoD, do not share SOCOM's concern. Though there is no single forum or body to make such decisions or socialize SOF-peculiar items, there are many avenues and processes SOCOM could consider. What's more, SOCOM should reevaluate some JROC processes it divested itself of in the name of acquisition at the "speed of war". While this may sacrifice the speed SOCOM desires, it may offer a better opportunity to transition SOF-peculiar items. On the whole, DoD would likely be better served too, especially in this era of fiscal conservatism and austerity.
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